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Immigration in the Brexit Campaign: protean 
dogwhistles and political manipulation.i 
 
In the aftermath of the Brexit vote, there has been much discussion of whether the 
vote was caused by anti-immigrant sentiment or by economic factors, or some 
combination of these.  Often, the anti-immigrant sentiment is referred to as racism, 
and quite often anti-immigrant and racist seem to be used interchangeably.  Its a 
notable feature of these discussionsthough not one that is actually much noted
that the immigrants against whom prejudice is directed shift from discussion to 
discussion: some discussions focus on prejudice against all foreigners, some against 
all Europeans, others against Eastern Europeans, and still others against refugees, 
dark-skinned foreigners, or Muslims.  A key contention of mine here is that the 
variety of possible targets for anti-immigrant sentiment (call this target uncertainty) 
has made this form of prejudice a particularly difficult one to effectively fight.  And 
key to this target uncertainty is the invocation of ever-shifting associated groups that 
are the target of negative sentiment about immigrantsdifferent groups for different 
speakers and audiences. 
 
I use the term protean dogwhistle for the way that invocations of immigration shift 
in terms of the groups that are associated with them.  This is not just because of the 
fact that a change is taking place.  The term protean comes from the story of 
Proteus, a water god who shape-shifts.  Crucially, this is his technique for avoiding 
revealing the truth: one can only get the truth from Proteus if one manages to catch 
and hold him through all his shape-shifting.  And the shape-shifting makes him nearly 
impossible to keep hold of in order to get to the truth.  This is, I suggest, a nice 
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metaphor for the way that the groups associated with immigration1 shift from context 
to context, making it difficult to effectively call attention to and criticize the prejudice 
involved when immigration is invoked as a threat.2 
 
In this paper, I begin with a bit of background about dogwhistles, which (broadly 
speaking) allow politicians to communicate (or at least prime) views that might 
alienate some voters while maintaining deniability.  In the context most discussed in 
this literature (white prejudice against black people in the US), we do not have the 
target uncertainty that occurs with the invocation of immigration in the UK.  The 
protean dogwhistle immigration poses special difficulties which I explore in detail.  In 
so doing, I shed light not just on the factors that led to the Brexit vote, but also on a 
previously unexplored complexity of dogwhistles. 
Dogwhistles, as I undersand them, work in two ways: either via ambiguity, 
communicating a hidden message to a subset of their audience; or via largely 
unconscious processes of activating associations without an audience's 
awareness.  Attention to dogwhistles has so far focused primarily on dogwhistles that 
communicate at most two messages.  However, some dogwhistles function in a much 
more complex way, activating different associations or communicating different 
messages for different audiences.  These are what I call protean dogwhistles  This 
paper takes as its focus the protean dogwhistles related to immigration in the UKs 
Leave campaign, arguing that they are likely to activate different associations for 
different audience members, and that this makes it far more complicated to respond to 
the invocation of immigration effectively. 
1. Dogwhistlesthe background 
The term dogwhistle comes from US politics, and most studies of dogwhistles have 
been US-based.  Moreover, most of the attention in this small literature has been on 
dogwhistles targeted at racist sentiments of white Americans toward black Americans.  
                                                        
1 I am italicizing immigrant and immigration in order to maintain neutrality 
about whether the term is actually used or the concept is more broadly invoked.  
For my purposes here, the differences between these two ways of invoking 
immigration or immigrant do not matter. 
2 Homer/Wilson 2017. 
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One key thing we will see in this paper is the complexities of applying what we know 
about dogwhistles outside this context. But first, some distinctions. 
 
1.1 Overt and Covert (intentional) Dogwhistles 
There are two kinds of intentional dogwhistles, which work in very different 
ways.  What they have in common is that they are communicative acts that, for 
their success, require the speaker to conceal something from at least part of her 
audience.  Usually, this will be because there are some (either local or culture-
wide) norms against a part of what the speaker is up to.  In this section, I will be 
writing only about intentional dogwhistles, so I will drop the word intentional 
for simplicitys sake. 
 
In an overt dogwhistle, a speaker has a message that they want to convey to one 
audience while concealing it from another audience.  An artificial case of this 
would be a speaker who exploits the ambiguity of bank to tell her fellow bank 
robbers that now is the moment to act: Lets go to the bank and have a picnic, 
she says, knowing that only her co-conspirators will think she is talking about a 
financial institution.  But ambiguous words are not needed: politicians can insert 
this sort of dogwhistle by using a phrase which one group will recognize as a 
religious reference and another will not.  George W. Bush did this when he talked 
about the wonder-working power of the American people. (Noah 2004) This 
phrase just sounds like political hyperbole to a voter without a fundamentalist 
Christian background.  But to one with that background it signifies the power of 
Christ, and its use serves to indicate that Bush is a fellow fundamentalist 
Christian.  I call this kind of dogwhistle overt because for the target group there 
is nothing concealedthey are meant to fully and consciously recognize the 
message being transmitted to them. 
 
A covert dogwhistle is less straightforward.  In a covert dogwhistle, the speaker 
seeks to activate particular attitudes of the audience and bring them to bear on the 
topic at issue.  The most-discussed covert dogwhistles in the American context are 
racial ones, like the phrase inner city or the infamous Willie Horton 
advertisement, both of which cause white racially resentful voters to make 
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decisions on the basis of their racial resentments (that is, resentment of black 
people), without realizing this (Mendelberg 2001; Horwitz and Peffley 2004; Saul 
forthcoming a). The Willie Horton advertisement was used by GHW Bushs 1988 
campaign against Michael Dukakis.  Its official subject matter was a policy of 
Massachusetts when Dukakis was governor, which allowed convicted felons to 
have weekend furloughs. During one of these furloughs, William Horton (he 
never went by Willie though this was the name given in the ad) committed rape 
and murder. The ad described this, and its sole visual was a grainy photograph of 
a scowling Horton, who was black.  Race was never mentioned in the ad. Tali 
Mendelbergs studies (Mendelberg 2001) found that exposure to the Willie Horton 
ad had no effect on white voters levels of racial resentment.  However, she found 
that exposure did increase the correlation between white voters racial resentment 
levels and their intentions to vote for Bush.  (The more racially resentful voters 
became more likely to vote for Bush.)  Mendelberg found, though, that it was 
crucial to the dogwhistles effectiveness that race remain unmentioned, enabling 
to message to act on voters intentions without their awareness.  (More on what 
led her to this conclusion shortly.) 
 
The reason that covert racial dogwhistles like this are needed was widespread 
acceptance of what Tali Mendelberg calls The Norm of Racial Equality.  The 
Norm of Racial Equality has been in force in the United States since the Civil 
Rights movement, and I have argued elsewhere (Saul 2017) that it is best 
understood as having the form dont be racist, with the judgments about what is 
racist left up to individuals.  White Americans tend to set a very high bar for what 
counts as racist, such a high bar that (as Mendelberg notes), claims like (1) are not 
seen as violating the Norm of Racial Equality. 
(1) Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame 
prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same 
without any special favours.3 
 
Those who accept statements like (1) are said to harbor high levels of Racial 
Resentment.  But this resentment is nonetheless compatible with endorsing the Norm 
                                                        
3 Tesler and Sears 2010: 19. 
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of Racial Equality.  And a large number of white Americans display just this 
combinationan endorsement of Racial Equality, alongside high levels of Racial 
Resentment. People like this will not engage in any behaviour that they see as racist, 
since they accept that this is wrong.  They are likely to think, for example, that their 
voting decisions should not be based on racial attitudes.  And this is why covert 
dogwhistles are an effective political technique: they allow politicians to tap into this 
racial resentment without voters awareness.  An overt racial appeal would not do 
this.  So, for example, Horwitz and Peffley (2004) found that white subjects attitudes 
toward prison building correlated with their levels of racial resentment when the 
prisons were described as for inner city criminals.  When the phrase inner city was 
dropped, there was no such correlation.  And if they asked about black criminals, we 
would also expect to see a lack of correlationbecause this would be too obviously 
about race.4 
 
1.2  Combatting overt and covert intentional dogwhistles 
Both sorts of dogwhistles have been seen as rather nefarious ways of manipulating a 
voting public. Unsurprisingly, then, there has been attention to how to undermine a 
dogwhistles effectiveness.   
 
Defusing an overt dogwhistle is straightforward.  Its success depends upon 
transmitting different messages to different groupskeeping both happy, even though 
one (call them the As) would not be happy if they knew what was being 
communicated to the other (the Bs).  The way to defuse this is to make both messages 
explicit. The speaker is potentially able to deny it (I really did just mean the 
riverbank! or I just thought wonder-working power was a poetic way to express 
my admiration), but sometimes there will be good evidence to undermine this denial 
(Then why the collection of masks and guns in your car? or Heres a well-
researched study showing that phrase is often used by fundamentalist Christians with 
the following meaning.) The effect of this, if effective, will be to alienate the As
whose support was conditional upon not knowing about the message for the Bs.  That 
if effective, however, is important.  If the As do not believe that the other message 
                                                        
4 Horwitz and Peffley did not actually test this version.  But this prediction is 
what the literature would lead us to expect. 
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was intended, this may backfire.  In such a case, the politician may well retain support 
of both As and Bs, and indeed the willingness of As to listen to critics may have been 
undermined. 
 
Now to covert dogwhistles. The classic discussion of covert dogwhistles comes from 
Mendelbergs study of the Willie Horton ad used by George HW Bush against 
Michael Dukakis in 1988, described above.  (Mendelberg, however, does not use the 
term dogwhistle, which has become popular since she wrote about this.  She refers 
to implicit political messages.)  She found that the ad initially brought about a 
correlation between white voters racial resentment and their intentions to vote for 
George HW Bush.  However, once Jesse Jackson raised the issue of racismeven 
though he was widely dismissed as wrongthis correlation began dropping away. I 
have, following Mendelberg, suggested this as a general strategy for dealing with a 
covert dogwhistle (Saul forthcoming). However, there are plausibly special features of 
the Willie Horton case that will not be present in all cases.  Indeed, I will suggest 
below that the invocation of immigration by the Leave campaign in the UK presents a 
case where this strategy is likely to fail. 
 
According to Mendelberg, a covert dogwhistle works by raising pre-existing racial 
atttitudes (whatever they are) to salience, so that they bring them to bear on whatever 
decision they are makingin this case, a voting decision.  But it does so, crucially, 
without the audiences awareness of it.  Jacksons suggestion that the ad might be 
racist, combined with (much of) the audiences acceptance of the Norm of Racial 
Equality, led (much of) the audience to engage in self-monitoring.  (This self-
monitoring may not be conscious, and it is in no way dependent on the voters thinking 
that Jackson was right, which they generally didnt.)  This self-monitoring began to 
block their racial attitudes from influencing their voteeven though, for the most 
part, they combined it with a conscious dismissal of Jacksons suggestion that racism 
might be important to the ad.  In order for this sort of self-monitoring to take place, it 
needs to be the case that the audience takes racism to be unacceptable, and this will be 
so for those who adhere to the Norm of Racial Equality (the target audience).  A form 
of bigotry which does not violate a norm that the audience accepts will not trigger 
self-monitoring.  There are many people, for example, who would not be moved by 
the suggestion that something displays anti-atheist prejudice, for example, because 
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they do not think it is problematic to oppose atheists.5  We would expect, then, that 
discussing anti-atheist prejudice would not trigger self-monitoring in such people. I 
call this necessary condition Norm Acceptance. 
 
But more is also required.  It need not be the case that the audience accepts or even 
finds it plausible that there is racism involved.6  Self-monitoring is triggered anyway 
if the audience takes racism to be unacceptable.  Howevercruciallythey will only 
self-monitor for the sort of racism that they take to be at issue.  What I will call Target 
Match must be present between the norm invoked and the group targeted by the 
dogwhistle.  Here is what Jesse Jackson said: 
There have been a number of rather blatantly race-conscious signals that have 
had the impact of instilling ungrounded fear in whites and alientation from 
Blacks," Jackson told reporters after the 90-minute breakfast with Dukakis. 
 
The use of the Willie Horton example is designed to create the most horrible 
psycho-sexual fears," Jackson said. 
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1988/10/24/bentsen-jackson-criticize-
bush-ads-pdemocratic/ 
 
Jesse Jackson made it clear in this quotation that the racism at issue was that of white 
people toward black people.  And self-monitoring for this form of racism then began 
to take place.  This self-monitoring meant that anti-black attitudes could not rise to 
salience without the audiences awareness.  It was crucial to this that the self-
monitoring was of a sort that could block the dogwhistles contentthis point will 
become crucial as we turn to the immigration example.  To take an imaginary case, 
suppose that someone had criticized the Willie Horton advertisement for anti-Chinese 
racism.  What this would trigger is monitoring for anti-Chinese racism.  This 
monitoring, we can suppose, would not be effective at blocking the influence of anti-
black racism. 
 
So, in order for the strategy of defusing the dogwhistle to work, we need two 
conditions to be met: 
                                                        
5 Currently, 42% of Americans would not vote for an atheist for president, which 
is actually the lowest level of anti-atheist prejudice ever found in such polls. (See 
Fidalgo 2015.) 
6 Recall the Willie Horton case, in which a strong consensus held race to be 
irrelevant, but in which nonetheless self-monitoring was triggered. 
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Norm Acceptance: The audience accepts the norm invoked by the would-be 
defusing utterance; and 
Target Match:  The target of the norm matches the target of the dogwhistle. 
 
In this paper, I will suggest that both of these necessary conditions for a defusing to 
succeed are likely to fail in the immigration-Brexit cases. 
 
2. Immigration as a protean dogwhistle in the Brexit 
campaign 
 
Now lets turn to the recent UK referendum on the EU.  It is widely agreed that 
immigration was the most important issue for Leave voters, who triumphed in a 
narrow victory.  And immigration is commonly thought to be a term that 
dogwhistles racism (Lopez 2013; Goodin 2008: 226).  My own experience as a 
white American immigrant (with clear American accent) seems to confirm this: 
people do not hesitate to complain to me about immigrants; and when I point out 
that I am one, they say that I am not what they mean.7   
 
The Brexit campaign clearly included dogwhistle racism, and inspired and 
emboldened those who were explicitly racist.  One week before the vote, a 
campaign poster was revealed which featured a huge crowd of dark-skinned 
people and the words breaking point.  This so closely resembled Nazi 
propaganda that it was reported as racial hate speech, which is illegal in the UK 
(http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/16/nigel-farage-defends-ukip-
breaking-point-poster-queue-of-migrants).8  That same day, a white supremacist 
murdered a member of parliament, Jo Cox who had been a prominent 
                                                        
7 The most obvious interpretation of this is that my whiteness is what makes me 
not the sort of immigrant they mean.  But it could be my American-ness, my non-
European-ness, my class position, my non-Muslim-ness, and so on. 
8 For a more detailed analysis of anti-immigrant visuals in the campaign, see 
Drainville 2016. 
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spokesperson for refugees and for remaining in the UK. In the week immediately 
following the referendum, racial hatred complaints quintupled.9 
 
So far, so straightforward, one might think: immigration is a racist dogwhistle, 
and invoking it raises racial attitudes to salience.  The standard recipe for 
combatting this is to point out the racism.  If there is a Norm of Racial Equality in 
force, people will want to avoid anything that they see as racist. This will cause 
them to engage in self-monitoring, and the dogwhistles wont work any more.  
But the thing is this: the racism was pointed out.  The role of racial hatred was 
given great prominence after the murder of Jo Cox, but it was regularly in the 
news before that. (See, e.g. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-
referendum-vote-leave-racist-brexit-khalid-mahmood-labour-mp-a7049381.html)  
We do not yet know what effect this had.  It may be that it did reduce the tendency 
to base ones vote on racism, but that this still was not enoughperhaps the 
discussion of racism was not given media prominence in the right places; perhaps 
it was too late in the campaign.  Hopefully political scientists will help us to 
understand this in the years to come (if they are able to fund their research).  
However, it seems to me that immigrationat least as it functioned in the context 
of the UK referendumbrings with it many complications that are absent from 
the Willie Horton ad or the American use of inner city. 
 
The complications are these: 
1. Immigration is protean in its associations, leading to contextual variation 
regarding the target of the dogwhistle: Different audiences will have 
different groups raised to salience by invocations of immigration.  
(Speakers will also vary in what groups they intend to communicate 
about.) 
2. For some of these targets, there is a lack of widely accepted anti-bigotry 
norms. 
3. For the widely accepted Norm of Racial Equality, there is uncertainty 
about what groups are targets of the norm. 
                                                        
9 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/30/police-report-fivefold-
increase-race-hate-crimes-since-brexit-result 
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2.1 Target variation (Protean associations of immigrant) 
 
It was very clear that African Americans are being dogwhistled about in the Willie 
Horton ad.  The same goes (generally) for inner city.10  But in the context of the UK 
referendum, there is no one group that is consistently being dogwhistled about in 
immigration discussions.  There is evidence of a relationship between the Leave vote 
and a variety of different group-based prejudices.   
 
A case can be made for understanding immigration as dogwhistling about dark-
skinned people.  The creator of the Breaking Point poster, for example, carefully 
placed a text box over the lone white person in the original photo (Drainville 2016).  
In so far as some voters have their attitudes toward dark-skinned people activated 
without their awareness, immigration is functioning as a dog-whistle for dark-skinned 
people.  
 
Immigration may also function as a dogwhistle about either Muslims, refugees, or 
Syrians.  The natural reading of the Breaking Point poster described above is as one 
depicting refugees.  These refugees will probably be taken as Muslim and, most 
likely, Syrian.  Some spectacularly deceptive literature (Drainville 2016) sent out by 
the Leave campaign was clearly designed to insinuate that staying in the EU would 
lead to an influx of people from Syria and Iraq (and these would probably be taken 
also to be both Muslim and Syrian/Iraqi).  Given this context, it is not unreasonable to 
take invocations of immigration to be dogwhistling about Muslims/refugees/Syrians 
& Iraqis.11 
 
                                                        
10 I say generally, because there are sometimes, for example, discussions of 
inner city Latinos.  Crucially, however, these tend to involve explicitly adding the 
word Latino, because otherwise it will be assumed that African Americans are 
under discussion. 
11 Again, theres no good argument available to connect Brexit to changing 
figures on Muslim/refugee/Syrian&Iraqi immigrants.  But this is not important 
to dogwhistle politics.  Also, the maps shown above, heavily imply the 
remarkable falsehood that Syria and Iraq are set to join the EU. 
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Another common target of anti-immigrant sentiment in the campaign was Eastern 
Europeans.  In recent years, Eastern Europeans like Romanians, Bulgarians, and Poles 
have gained the right to work in the UK without restriction.  There is substantial 
prejudice against these groups, and a plausible case can be made that this was a very 
important factor fuelling the success of the Leave campaign.  Certainly, the papers 
that supported the Leave campaign have been stoking these views for years, and were 
jubilantly reflecting them after the victory.  The Sun, for example, jubilantly ran the 
headline Where the Brex was won: streets full of Polish shops, kids not speaking 
English (https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1342831/streets-full-of-polish-shops-kids-
not-speaking-english-but-union-jacks-now-flying-high-again/). An exceptionally good 
case can be made that invocations of immigration were, on many occasions, 
dogwhistling about Eastern European immigrants.  And this is also plausible to link to 
the EU, since the EU required free movement of people from European countries. 
 
But the most obvious target of anti-immigration sentiment in an anti-EU campaign 
would surely be Europeansthe group whose immigration has been most facilitated 
by the EU.  And there is empirical evidence that anti-European sentiments did serve 
as a motivator of pro-Brexit votes.  Meleady et. al. 2017 found that negative attitudes 
toward EU immigrants were a better predictor of voting Leave than demographic 
factors.  (They did not compare the predictive powers these attitudes with those of 
other negative attitudes.) 
 
Finally, immigration may sometimes function as a xenophobic dogwhistle. It may, at 
first, seem somewhat strange to suggest this- simply because the xenophobia seems 
explicit in the opposition to immigration.  But this is not quite right. A xenophobe
one who fears foreignersmay also fear foreigners with no intention at all of coming 
to their country (like Brussels bureaucrats); or people who are not themselves 
immigrants, but who are nonetheless seen as foreigners (like children of immigrants).  
And there is also some evidence that this was the basis for some peoples voteswe 
see this in various explicit behaviours, like outpourings of nationally-tinged hostility 
against EU bureaucrats.  So xenophobia and anti-immigration sentiments come apart 
in terms of their targets. 
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Importantly, though, it is also possible to be anti-immigrant without being 
xenophobicand indeed it is possible to be anti-immigrant in a way that is not 
motivated by any prejudice. One might be anti-immigrant based on rationally well-
founded reasoning from false premises.  Voters who believed what the Tory party and 
right-wing press had been telling them may have thought that David Camerons 
government supported public services like the NHS well.  Well aware that waiting 
lists were too long and that staff were inadequate, they also believed the falsehood 
that strains on public services were due not to austerity cuts but to an excess of 
immigrants.  This led them to think that the UK was simply full.  One does not need 
to be prejudiced against any group of people wanting to come to the UK in order to 
think that there are already too many people here.  Crucial beliefs motivating this 
group of voters were false.  However, there need not be any dogwhistle affecting 
them.  (I do not know how many voters actually fit this description, and it would be 
difficult, and perhaps impossible to find out.  But it is important to acknowledge the 
possibility.  And after hearing a friends tale of her anti-immigrant, leave-voting 
refugee father, I suspect this is not just a theoretical possibility.) 
 
In short, for different portions of the audience, immigration will function differently: 
for some, it may not be a dogwhistle at all.  For others, it may be a dogwhistle about 
any or all of the following: foreigners, Eastern Europeans, refugees, Muslims, 
Syrians, or dark-skinned people.  Already, we see that immigrations protean 
associations make things much more complex than with the Willie Horton ad. 
 
2.2 Inadequacy of Norm of Racial Equality 
 
Pointing out racism very commonly causes significant anger in the person accused, 
and often in others.  Because of the Norm of Racial Equality, people are defensive, 
and some even consider the accusation to be almost taboo in all but the very clearest 
cases (e.g. slavery, KKK).  Second, and relatedly, there is often an exceptionally high 
standard for what counts as racism.  As Hill (2008) notes, it is standard for white 
people to believe in very strong necessary conditions for racismones that 
conveniently allow a denial of their own racism in almost all circumstances.  
Commonly, the standard for being a racist is thought to require clearly-expressed 
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conscious intentional discrimination on the basis of biological group-based 
superiority.  Racism that meets this standard is comparatively rare, so there is a great 
deal of room to view allegations of racism as unjust and hyperbolicthus further 
fuelling the anger.  In the Willie Horton case, we saw both of these negative aspects to 
a racism allegation: it was treated as patently absurd, and Jackson was angrily accused 
of playing the race card.  Howeverand this is crucialthe self-monitoring that 
was nonetheless triggered made it worthwhile to make the allegation. 
 
There is (still) a widely accepted Norm of Racial Equality.12  People do (for the most 
part) want to avoid racism, so self-monitoring is often triggered by an allegation of 
racism.  Compare this, for example, with an allegation of anti-atheist prejudice.  Since 
we lack a widespread norm against this prejudice, we cannot mobilise the force of 
such a norm to trigger self-monitoring.  An allegation of racism, then, can defuse a 
dogwhistleeven if it is not well-received in other ways. 
 
In messier contexts, however, there are further problems that come with allegations of 
racism.  The Willie Horton context was in many ways quite simple.  The ads 
dogwhistle was directed exclusively at white voters.  Racism is in the US interpreted 
by default as about white-on-black racism, and anyway Jackson made it clear that this 
is what he was discussing.  The case of the UK referendum is far more complex.   
 
A key disadvantage of the term racism in contexts like this one is that disagreements 
over what counts as racism can make it an ineffective term to use.  The Norm of 
Racial Egalitarianism does seem to hold in the UK.  And, similarly to the US (though 
not identically) the paradigm case of racism is generally understood to be prejudice of 
whites against darker-skinned people.  But, as noted above, this is only one of the 
things that might be dogwhistled by the Leave campaigns invocation of the protean 
notion immigration.  For other audiences, what is dogwhistled is about other groups
Eastern Europeans, foreigners, Syrians, Muslims, or refugees.  And each of these 
strays importantly from the paradigm case of prejudice against the dark-skinned.  
                                                        
12 One might be inclined to think this is no longer true, in the Trump era.  I 
address this thought in detail in my (2017), arguing that (a) there is good 
evidence that the norm is still in force, but (b) Trump is using what I call 
figleaves to circumvent it. 
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Eastern Europeans are generally white, and it is a widespread view that one cannot be 
racist against white people, or at least that white people cannot be racist against white 
people.  Foreigners come in all skin colours. Syrian is a nationality.  Islam is a 
religion not a race.  And refugee refers to anyone (of whatever skin colour) escaping 
persecution.   
 
Suppose now that an advertisement about immigration is accused of dogwhistle 
racism.  Focus on the portion of the audience that (a) accepts the Norm of Racial 
Equality; and (b) has their attitudes against Muslims raised to salience without their 
awareness.  If they take the Norm of Racial Equality to preclude prejudice against 
Muslims, then the monitoring may well be effective in defusing the ad.  (And, just as 
in the Willie Horton case, this may happen even if they do not consciously believe 
that the ad is anti-Muslim.)  But if they do not take the Norm of Racial Equality to 
preclude prejudice against Muslims- say, because they take Muslims not to be a racial 
groupthen the Target Match condition will not be met and the monitoring will not 
be effective.  Compelling arguments can be made that religious prejudice should be 
understood as a form of racism (see for example Topolski 2018).  But these 
arguments are irrelevant to the blocking of dogwhistle effects.  Even if religious 
prejudice should be understood as racism, the fact that many do not understand it this 
way means that, for these people, raising the possibility of racism will not block the 
dogwhistle effect, due to a lack of Target Match. 
 
And things get worse from here.  One who is opposed to Muslim immigration but 
considers this to be about religion rather than race will feel misunderstood by those 
who make allegations of racism.  Their prejudice will be left intact, it will still be 
brought to bear on their decisions, they will be angry at being accused of racism, and 
they will feel that their concernsabout religion, not race (as they see it) are not 
being understood. 
 
One solution would be to attempt to address the various different ways the protean 
dogwhistle might function: to invoke norms matching each target, in order to meet the 
Target Match condition. Ideally, one would call attention to Islamophobia for some 
audiences, to anti-Eastern European prejudice for others, etc.  But this just isnt 
possible.  These are mass media dogwhistles, with massive and internally complex 
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audiences. To do this, one would have to list off all the possible prejudices tapped 
into.  It may completely accurate to say that an advertisement taps into xenophobia, 
racism, anti-Eastern European prejudice, and Islamophobia, and that for some 
people it taps into false beliefs but not any of these prejudices, but there are 
rhetorical difficulties with attempting a commentary of this complexity.  One key 
difference is that the various audiences are likely to find other audiences 
understandings of the target of the dogwhistle implausible, which will tend to lower 
the credibility of a bigotry claim that explicitly references all of them. 
 
An alternative would be to use a more general term like bigotry.  There are 
widespread norms against bigotryfew, if any, would self-identify as a bigot.  And 
bigotry is a general term that can cover all the forms of prejudice that use of 
immigrant may tap into.  However, it is genuinely uncertain whether it would trigger 
the needed self-monitoring.  This would require a Target Match between whatever 
groups are taken to be targets of bigotry and the dogwhistle, and its just not clear that 
the targets of an anti-bigotry norm will extend in the right way.  Those who think that 
Muslims are dangerous will not take this to be bigotry; those who think that Eastern 
Europeans drink too much will not take this to be bigotry.  It may be that their self-
monitoring will still be triggered in the right way. But this is a matter which requires 
empirical study, and it is far from obvious what that study will indicate.  
 
2.3 Lack of widely accepted norms 
 
As noted in the previous section, there are very widespread norms against racism.  
The other prejudices one might tap into with an invocation of immigration, however, 
are very different, so it is unclear that the Norm Acceptance condition will be met.  
Ill take just a few examples here. 
 
Nationalistic pride is far more acceptable than white pride, and criticisms and 
mockery of other nations far more socially acceptable than criticisms and mockery of 
other races.  Being called nationalist is not always a criticism in the way that being 
called racist is, and it is much more common (and socially acceptable) for someone 
to claim nationalist as a part of their identity than for them to claim racist in this 
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way.  Note, for example, that mainstream political parties (e.g. the Scottish 
Nationalist Party) use nationalist in their names, but that few use racist.  (And if 
they did, they wouldI hopenot secure a strong majority in a country like 
Scotland.) 
 
Religious prejudice is also more acceptable than racist prejudiceas we can see from 
the efforts made by those insisting that Islamophobia is not racism.  Even a poll which 
carefully distinguished Islam from fundamentalist groups found that more than 
50% of UK citizens took the religion to pose a threat to Western democracy (Dore 
2015).  Those people who are willing to admit explicit attitudes like these to pollsters, 
it is highly likely that they do not think it is at all bad to dislike Muslims, or that they 
fear Muslim immigration.  There is no norm against Islamophobia that enjoys such 
wide acceptance as the Norm of Racial Equality. 
 
Dislike of people from Eastern Europe is, similarly, not widely seem as problematic.  
While racism is considered taboo, prejudice against members of particular white 
nations is not seen as racism.  It is often linked to generalisations about culture (for 
example, drinking culture13), or to willingness to work for low wages.  When thought 
of in this way, it seems to many to be perfectly reasonable rather than a manifestation 
of prejudice.  I strongly suspect that there are no norms at all forbidding prejudice 
against Europeans more generally, but I have not been able to find any studies of this. 
 
4. Other causes of the Brexit vote 
There were a wide variety of factors that caused people in the UK to vote Leave, 
some of which were not linked at all to immigration.  Some people genuinely believed 
the promise of the Leave campaigners that the NHS would receive an additional 350 
million pounds each week.  Some voted Leave out of dislike for David Cameron, the 
Tory Prime Minister, who was seen as the face of the Remain campaign.  Very much 
relatedly, the Labour Leader Jeremy Corbyns support for Remain was so lackluster 
that Labour voters were not sure of the partys position, and saw the vote as an 
                                                        
13 < http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/boston-how-a-
lincolnshire-town-became-the-most-divided-place-in-england-a6838041.html>. 
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opportunity to stick it to David Cameron in the words of one Labour supporter a 
friend spoke to.14 Some voters wrongly blamed the EU for austerity policies, and the 
loss of manufacturing jobs.15  There were also a (relatively small) number of Lexit 
voters, who opposed the EU as a racist, neoliberal, pro-free-trade institution; or 
opposed it on the basis of e.g. its treatment of the Greek financial crisis or refugees.16  
The fact that some voters based their decision on factors like these becomes important 
in the next section of this paper. 
 
5. Further effects of racism narrative regarding 
immigration 
 
So far, my focus has been on (a) ways that labeling Brexit discussions of immigration 
as racist may fail to defuse any dogwhistles at work; and (b) ways that other 
attempts to defuse the dogwhistles may fail.  Now I turn to further effects that these 
failed efforts may have, which are even more worrying and dangerous. 
 
Since the referendum vote, a large number of articles have equated anti-immigration 
sentiment and racism.  Moreover, they have tended to focus on very explicit racist 
behaviours. Take, for example, the articles entitled Brexit: Increase in Racist Attacks 
After EU Referendum17, and Racist Incidents Feared to be Linked to Brexit 
Result18, both of which focused almost exclusively on anti-Polish sentiment. Indeed, 
this has been a dominant narrative in the press. As I have already noted, there are 
indeed connections between these sentiments, but the reality is much more complex.  
It has become a commonplace that the Leave vote was due to anti-immigration views, 
                                                        
14 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36574526 
15 https://vimeo.com/172932182 
16 See, for example < http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/why-i-am-voting-
for-lexit-eu-brexit-out-a7093151.html>.  Or see the Socialist Workers 
Endorsement of Leave: < 
https://socialistworker.co.uk/art/42434/Six+myths+about+the+European+Uni
on>. 
17 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/brexit-increase-racist-attacks-eu-
referendum-160628045317215.html 
 
18 http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/26/racist-incidents-feared-
to-be-linked-to-brexit-result-reported-in-england-and-wales 
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where these are understood as racism, and there has been a slide from this claim to 
discussing incidents of explicit violent racism.  This gives the impression that 52% of 
voters are explicit (perhaps even latently violent) racists.   
 
This would be a devastatingly important truth to grasp, if it were true.  But we do not 
actually have sufficient evidence for its truth, and in fact there is substantial evidence 
that Leave votes had quite a variety of causes.   These causes included false financial 
claims and promises from Leave campaigners, distrust of David Cameron, and weak 
campaigning by Labour.19  Propagating the unsubstantiated claim that 52% of voters 
are overt and latently violent racists, however, arguably has very damaging effects.   
 
According to Social Norm Theory, descriptive norms provide a standard from which 
people do not want to deviate(Schultz et. al. 2007: 430).  Efforts to reduce an 
undesirable behavior by telling people about actual prevalence of the behavior only 
succeed where the prevalence is low.  Where the prevalence is high, these efforts have 
a tendency to backfire, causing those who did not formerly engage in the behavior to 
think it is acceptable and start engaging in it (Schultz).20  Indeed, research has shown 
that this is one way in which implicit bias training can backfire.  On its own, the 
information that most people harbor racist biases makes subjects more likely to act on 
racist biases (Duiguid and Thomas-Hill).21 
 
Now consider what the effect would be of propagating inflated statisticssay, 
overstating the number of people who drive while drunk. Social norm theory would 
predict that this would lead to an increase in drunk driving.   If the complicated 
picture suggested here is right, then only some Leave voters were motivated by 
something that they themselvesif fully aware of itwould recognize as racism. 
Recall that some of them were influenced by factors having nothing at all to do with 
immigration. But after the vote, a widespread narrative took hold: that (explicit) 
racism caused the Brexit vote.  Since 52% of voters voted Leave, this amounts to the 
claim that 52% of the population is (explicitly) racist.  Now think what social norm 
                                                        
19 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36574526 
20 https://www.jsmf.org/meetings/2008/july/social%20norms%20Cialdini.pdf 
21 Importantly, this effect is fully counteracted by telling subjects that most 
people struggle to overcome their racist biases. 
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theory would predict as a result of this information being propagated: racism will 
come to seem far more acceptable.  Just as people are more willing to litter or drive 
drunk if they think it is common, so also people will be more willing to express and 
act on their racism if they think it is common. 
 
And this appears to be precisely what has happened since the referendum vote.  In the 
week following this vote, there was, as noted above, racist22 hate crime increased 
fivefold. It is difficult to see what could explain the timing of this increase other than 
a legitimation effect.  Frustration can be a cause of crime, but these are people whose 
side has just won.  Similarly, the crime could be seen as a kind of protest, but this 
again conflicts with the timing.  A spike in crime after victory in the referendum is 
best explainable by a result of legitimation of racist sentiments, which made people 
more willing to act.  And the most obvious explanation for this is the widespread 
reporting that the referendum victory was due to racismwhich led people to believe 
that overt racists were in the majority. 
 
This presents us with a seriously difficult situation.  Racism, however, one 
understands the concept, did play an important role in the referendum vote.  But so 
did various other prejudices; and, most likely, various sentiments and beliefs that were 
not prejudices at all.  It is vitally important to find a way to draw attention to prejudice 
without at the same time legitimating it.  The study cited earlier gives us a hint of a 
way forward for this: we must emphasise not just widespread racism, but also 
widespread explicit rejection of racism, and a widespread desire to overcome 
unconscious racism. But we must also be careful not to fall back on oversimple, 
monolithic explanations. Difficult as it is to explain complex phenomena, it seems to 
me very important to tease apart the many different sentiments and false beliefs that 
were involved in a complex phenomenon like the Leave vote.  Simple narratives like 
it was racism obscure our understanding, and are very likely to backfire. 
 
This paper has argued for a recognition of complexity in thinking about both the 
causes of the Brexit vote, and the role of  immigration as a protean dogwhistle in pro-
                                                        
22 This crime is called racist, butsignificantly for this paperit includes crime 
against white Eastern Europeans, like Poles. 
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Brexit campaigning. Immigration may be associated with different groups in the 
minds of different voters, and this shiftiness makes it more difficult to defuse 
immigration-related dogwhistles.  This difficulty is magnified by the absence of 
widely accepted anti-prejudice norms with regard to some of these groups. When 
assessing overall causes of the Brexit vote, moreover, things are complicated yet 
further by the need to acknowledge both the role that prejudice, particularly racism, 
played; and the need not to overstate this role.  Identifying a way out of these 
difficulties is a large and difficult task for the future.  The goal of this paper was 
simply to clarify the difficulties and complexities that face us. 
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